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SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION-THE STYLES
OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
William R. Andersen*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Current debates about the legality of public school funding systems
recognize that existing systems combine state, local, and federal revenue
sources. The exact nature of the governmental partnership involved is
seldom specified, however, and the result is that the institutional relationships are not clearly seen. This failure of perception leads to difficulties when a court is asked to determine the constitutionality of such systems. Two recent state school finance opinions' will be analyzed here to
compare two different styles of judicial intervention. This article does
not deal with all school finance litigation 2 nor with all styles of judicial
involvement in that litigation. The cases discussed, however, represent
two typical approaches, and the contrast between them is instructive.
Some general observations about the nature of the state-local partnership
precede the case discussions.
II.

NATURE OF THE SCHOOL FUNDING PARTNERSHIP

A. A Note on State Participationin Public Education-Originsand
Criticisms
Though public education has historically been perceived as a local service, both state and local levels of government today bear heavy respon*Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.S., 1954, University of Denver; L.L.B., 1956,
University of Denver; L.L.M., 1958, Yale Law School.
1. Seattle School Dist. No. I v. State, 90 Wn. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978); Board of Educ.,
Levittown v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
2. For recent summaries of school finance litigation, see Levin, Current Trends in School FinanceReform Litigation:A Commentary, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1099; Lindquist & Wise, Developments in
Education Litigation:EqualProtection, 5 J.L. & EDuc. 1 (1976); Comment, Buse v. School Finance
Reform: A Case Study of the Doctrinal,Social, and Ideological Determinants of JudicialDecisionmaking, 1978 Wis. L. Rev. 1071, 1074-80. See also Thomas, Equalizing EducationalOpportunity
Through School FinanceReform: A Review Assessment, 48 U. CIN. L. Rtv. 255 (1979) for general
background and history.
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sibility for funding the public schools in most states. 3 State involvement
in the management and funding of local public schools has been justified
on two grounds. The first is the need to insure that certain educational
standards are adhered to on a uniform, statewide basis. There is a long
history of state involvement in areas such as curricular design, length of
school year, textbook selection, and teacher certification. The purpose of
these measures has been either to assure a certain minimum level with
respect to the matter regulated, or to insure statewide uniformity. As a
result, state standards have been imposed and the views of the local users
4
of the system have been overridden.
The second ground for state intervention is to prevent unfairness in
funding public education. If funding were left entirely to local levels of
government (even with state-mandated, minimum programs), unfairness
to taxpayers and to the schoolchildren themselves would arise. This unfairness stems from the widely differing amounts of tax resources located
within the boundaries of each school district in a state, 5 a resource difference which may bear no relationship to the district's revenue needs. If
property tax revenues were used to fund schools, for example, a district
with a high amount of taxable property value per pupil would have a
great advantage in raising school dollars over a district with a relatively
low amount of taxable value per pupil. In tax wealthy districts (typically
areas with high concentrations of industrial and commercial properties),
any given level of tax effort would produce more school dollars per pupil
than the same level of tax effort in less wealthy districts. To residential
owners in tax rich districts the effect would be a reduction in the tax price
of public education. The residential owner in a poor district, by compari6
son, would pay a higher tax price for the same educational service.
3. The following figures show the estimated revenue receipts and percentage distribution of receipts for elementary and secondary education by governmental source for 1976-77:
Governmental

Revenue receipts

source

(in millions)

Federal
State
Local

$6,254
32,585
35,963

ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL

Percentage

distribution
8.4
43.6
48.1

RELATIONS, SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF FISCAL FEDERALISM,

1978-79 EDITION 19, Table 12 (1979).
4. The state's legal power to control the substance of public education is undoubted. See A.
MORRIS, THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN EDUCATION 263-65 (1974).
5. See 1 PRESIDENT'S
GRAMS 14 (1971).

COMM'N ON SCHOOL FINANCE, REVIEW OF EXISTING STATE SCHOOL FINANCE PRO-

6. A comparison of the tax price of raising $400 per pupil in Washington school districts computed by the Washington Research Council shows that in Washington, the tax increase on a $25,000
home varies from a low of $70.75 in Anacortes to a high of $406.75 in Franklin Pierce. Washington
State Research Council, Monthly Report 3 (Dec. 1976). In Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v.
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Moreover, where local choice exists about the level of the service to be
provided, these price differences may have substantial effects on the
amount of the service purchased. Hence the schoolchildren, as well as
the taxpayers, may be affected by the funding scheme.
Variations in local funding capacities are not, of course, peculiar to
school funding; they affect all locally funded public services. The city
which is wealthy in per capita tax base will have an easier time funding
street repairs, police and fire services, waste disposal facilities, and
parks. This kind of wealth discrimination in the provision of most local
services has been accepted historically, at least in the absence of racial
overtones. 7 Nonetheless, in the school funding area, this sort of wealth
effect has been considered a special problem.
The potential inequity to taxpayers and schoolchildren resulting from
local school funding has been recognized in the United States for more
than 50 years. 8 Most states have responded with a form of equalizing
grant program, specifically designed to compensate for the unequal distribution of the tax wealth in the state, and to soften the effects of tax
poverty in poor districts. 9 Through such programs, the states have become significant partners in funding the nation's public schools. By the
1960's, something like 40% of all school monies came from state treasuries in the form of flat grants, equalizing grants, or categorical aid. 10
The wave of litigation which began in the late 1960's and continued
through the 1970's11 grew from an awareness that state equalization programs did not eliminate enough of the wealth discrimination inherent in
local school funding systems. In part, the inadequacy of equalization
Kinnear, 84 Wn. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974) the superior court judge, after hearing evidence on an
original application for writs of prohibition and mandamus to the Washington Supreme Court at the
request of the supreme court, found that the cost of raising $100 per pupil to the owner of a $25,000
residence in Federal Way was $99, while in Seattle the cost was only $25. Findings of Fact Pursuant
to Reference Hearing at 18-19, Fact 61(c), Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, No. 46166
(Thurston County Super. Ct., Mar. 23, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Findings of Fact, Northshore
School Dist. v. Kinnear].
7. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), affid en banc, 461 F.2d 1171
(1972), discussed in Comment, Potholes, Lampposts and Policement: Equal Protectionand the Financing of Municipal Services in the Wake of Hawkins and Serrano, 17 VILL. L. REV. 655 (1972).
For a more recent analysis, see P. DIMOND, C. CHAMBERLAIN & W. HILLYARD, A DILEMMA OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT (1978); R. LINEBERRY, EQUALITY AND URBAN POLICY (Sage 1977).
8. E. CUBBERLEY, SCHOOL FUNDS AND THEIR APPORTIONMENT (Teachers College, Columbia Univ.
Contributions to Education, No. 2, 1906); P. MORT, STATE SUPPORT FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS (abr. ed.
1935); G. STRAYER & R. HAIG, THE FINANCING OF EDUCATION IN THE STATE OF NEw YORK (1923). While
this early literature launched most modem equalization programs, it was not until the appearance of
C. BENSON, ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC EDUCATION (1961), that current litigation theories began to emerge.
9. J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970) [hereinafter cited as COONS, CLUNE& SUGARMAN].

10.
11.

See note 3 supra.
See note 2 supra.
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plans was a simple matter of underfunding. Where state programs did not
keep up with escalating education costs, the result was increasing dependence on educational dollars from unequal local sources. In the State of
Washington, for example, the state share of educational funding decreased from 59.2% to 42.5% between 1964-65 and 1974-75.12 The
corresponding increase in the local share meant that equalization was losing force: educational funding levels were being allowed to vary as a
function of local wealth.
In part, too, the failure of equalization programs was the result of infirmities in the technical funding formulas themselves. For example, districts with concentrations of pupils with more expensive educational
needs (such as special-education students) would be relatively underfunded by a per pupil grant program. Similarly, if the costs of operating
an educational plant were higher in one area than another (due to factors
such as higher real estate costs, salary differentials, and security), equal
per pupil grants would not purchase equal educational services.
Finally, it was arguable that equalization plans that did not reflect significant interarea differences in noneducational tax burdens could not accurately measure relative educational tax sacrifice and were to that extent
defective.
In response to these types of criticisms, research began to appear in the
1960's which identified the patterns of inequity and suggested litigative
strategies for approaching the problems if legislative solutions were not
forthcoming. 13
B.

A Model for Analysis-The Characteristicsof Centralized and
Localized EducationalFunding Systems

School finance litigation-and the ensuing legislative debates-has
begun to clarify the nature of the state-local partnership in school funding. Despite the interstate differences and proliferation of technical details, there are relatively few basic structural components of most public
school finance systems. A convenient way to identify the basic components of a joint state-local system is to compare the essential attributes of
a funding system which is centralized at the state level with a system
which is decentralized to the local level.
12.

Findings of Fact, Northshore School Dist. v. Kinnear, supra note 6, at 7, Fact 10; WASHINGDEPT. OF REVENUE, 1975 TAX REFERENCE MANUAL 122 (1975).

TON STATE

13. The seminal, developed legal analysis is COONS, CLUNE & SUGARMAN, supranote 9, which in
turn builds on A. WISE, RICH SCHoOLS, POOR SCHOOLS (1968) and Horowitz, Unseparate But
Unequal-The Emerging Fourteenth Amendment Issues in Public Education, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1147 (1966).
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1.

Centralized Funding

In a funding system which is completely centralized at the state level,
all tax dollars used to provide the services in question are paid into the
state treasury by state taxpayers, and are disbursed from that treasury to
fund the service involved. The state might provide the service itself (as it
does with the highway patrol), it might buy the service from an independent vendor (as it may do with nursing homes), or it might provide funds
to a unit of local government to produce the service (as it does, in part,
with the public schools). Whichever method is chosen, all the money
comes from the state and all the decisions about funding levels are made
at the state level.
One of the chief characteristics of such a system is uniform service
levels. While service would vary as a function of different area needs or
costs, variations reflecting local taxpayer wealth or differing taxpayer
preferences would not exist.
In the public education context, this kind of uniformity has its proponents and its detractors. Some feel that all schoolchildren in a state
should receive the same quality of education, irrespective of the wealth
of their parents, the tax wealth of the school district, or the willingness of
local electors to finance education. Many feel, too, that this sort of equality in educating future citizens is an important component in meeting the
political needs of the democratic system.14
On the other hand, uniformity of educational service levels is regarded
as a disadvantage by those who believe local taxpayers and parents
should have some choice in determining the size of an area's educational
investment. They point out that in a fully centralized system, an area
which wants more expensive public schools than the state is willing to
provide is not permitted to increase spending to achieve that objective
(any more than people in one area of the state can buy extra state highway patrolmen if they feel the need for the service and are willing to pay
for it). By the same token, if an area wants less expensive schools, it cannot reduce its spending in a centralized system. Parents are unable to
choose to invest their money in ways they feel would be more useful to
their children, either by investing in alternative public services (such as
parks or welfare) or by reducing tax burdens to permit the purchase of
private services (such as travel or home tutoring).15
14.

1 FLEISCHmAN REPORT 55-57, 60-63, 85-95 (Viking ed. 1973); ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTER-

GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FINANCING SCHOOLS AND PROPERTY TAX RELIEr-A STATE RESPONSIBILITY

(1973); Silard & Goldstein, TowardAbolition of Local Fundingin Public Education, 3 J.L. & EDUC.
307 (1974). For a general analysis, see Campbell & Gilbert, The Governance andPoliticalImplications of EducationalFinance, in SCHOOL FINANCE IN TRmASrToN 199 (J. Pincus ed. 1974).
15. COONS, CLUNE & SUGARMAN, supra note 9, at 14-20.
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A second characteristic of a completely centralized funding system is
substantial central control over programs and standards. In addition to
control over funding levels, one would expect the central funding authority to exercise substantial control over the manner in which the money is
spent. This is obvious if the state is providing the service itself. It is just
as clear when the state chooses to provide the service by independent
contractor or by funding a unit of local government. In either case, state
standards will be imposed to control the uses to which the state money is
being put. A centralized funding system for public schools, therefore,
would no doubt see increased state control over educational programs,
standards, teacher compensation, and the like.
Central control of funding does not, however, require total central
control of programs and standards. Although the state would insist on a
level of control sufficient to insure that its money was being spent efficiently and for the intended purpose, significant control of programs
could be left in the discretion of local governments operating with statedetermined funding levels. The degree of local control of programs
would, of course, be a decision for the central authority.
As with uniform service levels, central control of programs has its supporters and its critics. Supporters point to program uniformity across the
state, which insures a known educational base for the future citizens of
the state and which facilitates mobility. On the other hand, critics point
out that central control of programs makes it impossible (at least difficult) for different areas to respond to different educational needs. Thus,
even assuming two districts are happy with central decisions about funding levels, one district might want to spend its money on more collegelevel math for its predominantly college-bound students, while another
might prefer more vocational education for its students. To the extent one
perceives real differences in the educational needs of different areas of
the state, central control of programs which results in inflexible program
uniformity can be undesirable. 16
Beyond controlling funding levels and standards, a central funding
authority could be expected to become the administrative center of the
system. Although this is not logically required-the state could provide
the dollars and leave all administrative details to local units-in the real
world some centralized administration would be inevitable. In the public
education setting, centralization might extend as far, for example, as
state-wide collective bargaining for teacher salaries-an arrangement
which might alter the degree of economic power exercised by public em16. In spite of this, some see advantages in central control of programs. See Silard & Goldstein,
supra note 14.
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ployee unions and the degree of local control thought to be implicit in the
local power to negotiate wages.
Still another characteristic of a centralized funding system is that it
will permit the use of the greatest range of taxes, thereby affording the
maximum range of choice in allocating tax burdens among citizens. A
centralized system can effectively employ tax instruments reaching sales,
income, and property as taxable forms of wealth. Since each tax instrument has a different pattern of incidence, choice from among tax instrihments permits the state to determine with some care (subject of course to
the usual doubt about the reliability of our incidence theories) 17 which
income classes in the state will bear which shares of the cost of government. Funding education through a progressive income tax, for example,
will have a different effect on lower income people than funding the
service through a regressive property or sales tax. The state-with full
control over all forms of taxes--can locate the incidence of school taxes
where, in its view, such incidence is most desirable. Local governments,
by contrast, cannot effectively reach sales and income as significant
forms of taxable wealth, since those tax bases are movable. For example,
if a city imposes a sales tax sizeable enough to fund its schools, many
residents would shop in the suburbs. As a result, the burdens of paying
for education in a locally funded system will be distributed according to
the incidence patterns of the property tax, which has a nonmovable base.
Finally, central funding may seem the only way to achieve real equalization. If the state produces the service, or funds local provision of the
service with uniform funding levels, there will be equalization by definition: service levels will not vary with local taxpayer wealth, or with the
tax wealth of the area. Even if the state permits some variation of funding
levels, equalization is possible by formulas guaranteeing a local area
equal dollars for equal tax effort. As will be seen below, some states are
experimenting with such systems in education finance; but they must be
18
administered at the central level.
Localized Funding

2.

In contrast to the centralized model, a locally funded model has largely
the opposite features. There will generally be nonuniform service levels
17.

R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 400 (2d ed. 1976).

The incidence of the property tax has been of special concern in education funding. See A. ODDEN &
P. VINCENT, THEREGRESSIVrrY OFTHE PROPERTY TAx (Educ. Comm'n of the Rep. States Rep. No. F764, 1976); Ladd, The Role of the PropertyTax: A Reassessment, in BROAD BASED TAXES: NEW OPUONS
AND SOURCES 39 (R. Musgrave ed. 1973); Silard & Goldstein, supra note 14, at 326-28.
18. See Barro, Alternative Post-Serrano Reforms and Their Expenditures Implications, in
SCHOOL FINANCE IN TRANsMON (J. Pincus ed. 1974).
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as the effects of different tastes and of wealth disparities manifest themselves. Similarly, there will be nonuniform standards and programs,
which will be subject to local control. Some additional features of locally
funded systems warrant further comment.
Local funding is generally perceived as providing the consumer of the
service with enhanced control over those producing the service. This
control may be direct, as when the citizen has the opportunity to vote on
a particular budget item (such as in a special school levy election), or it
may be indirect, as where the citizen votes for local officials who, in
turn, make budget decisions. In either case, it is commonly assumed that
the citizen has more control over the service if funding and program decisions are made locally. Of course, the state legislature is also a representative body, but it may not be perceived as representing citizens in the
same way, or on the same issues. Many would feel, for example, that as
local citizens they have more control over local police services than they
do over state highway patrol services. Some degree of accountability,
therefore, is felt implicit in local funding, and may be a strong element in
the resistance to central funding.
Another aspect of local funding appears whenever the local system
gives voters direct control over a particular budget by some special election process. Special elections are, for one thing, expensive, and if frequent, may interfere with orderly planning. The uncertainty generated by
an annual levy vote on a significant part of the budget makes efficient
planning of long-term programs all but impossible.
Perhaps the most important feature of local voting, however, is that
the service in question is singled out for a more intense citizen control
than are other public services. Of course, no one would suggest that elections are objectionable merely because people can use them to vote tax
reductions. The problem is rather a distortion in choice that arises in a
system in which only one service is subject to direct vote, while others
are subject to the more generalized kind of control involved in legislative
appropriation. Especially in times of taxpayer retrenchment, the service
singled out for special public vote is something of a sitting duck. It is
likely to be the place where the taxpayer expresses his desire to lower
taxes, not because the service is the one most deserving of a cut, but for
the less elegant reason that it is the only service over which he has direct
budgetary control. With special voting on school budgets, for example,
cutting school spending is simply easier than cutting police spending.
As has been indicated, a fundamental characteristic of local funding is
that funding levels are to some degree a function of individual and of
district wealth. Proponents urge that local funding gives local taxpayers
more choice, while opponents argue that, in reality, the availability of
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choice is unevenly distributed: districts composed of taxpayers of larger
than average incomes have more real choice, for example, than do districts made up of the relatively poor. Since people tend to locate in areas
populated by those with similar incomes, the smaller one draws the
boundaries for funding a service, the greater the likelihood that the area
will be economically homogenous. That, in turn, increases the likelihood
that decisions about spending levels will be affected by taxpayer wealth.
Just as one would expect expenditures among the relatively wealthy to be
higher for homes, cars, food, and clothing, so one would expect school
spending to be higher in districts composed of relatively wealthy taxpayers in a locally controlled funding system. In the analysis presented here,
therefore, one characteristic of a centralized funding system is its ability
to eliminate the disparate effects of local taxpayer wealth which characterize a system of local funding.
Beyond the question of individual wealth, local funding will also permit variations in local tax wealth to affect decisions about spending
levels. Tax-rich districts will be able to spend at high levels with low tax
rates; tax-poor districts will be unable to spend at high levels even with
near-confiscatory tax rates.
Local funding also permits cost differences to affect outcomes. As indicated above, districts with concentrations of high-cost pupils, or districts with higher per pupil transportation, security, or other costs cannot
match the service levels of other districts even if their per student revenues are equal.
Finally, the choice of local funding means reliance on the property tax,
the only tax with a nonmovable base and hence, as a practical matter, the
only tax available to local governments in significant amounts. Choosing
local funding, therefore, means choosing that particular package of regressivities and inelasticities that characterizes the property tax. Other
patterns of tax incidence are unavailable to local governments, although
state programs, such as income-related property tax relief, may vary the
final incidence of the property tax.
C.

The Role of the Courts

It is apparent from the above review of the nature of the state-local
partnership in school funding that the question of institutional design presented relates to the proper blend of central and local features of the system. The pure centralized system has serious disadvantages, as does the
pure decentralized system. By legislative "fine-tuning," one can approach that particular blend of central and local components which will
produce the desired level of uniformity, the proper degree of
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equalization, the correct tax incidence, and the appropriate deference to
local tastes-all within an acceptable administrative regime.
These are delicate adjustments with obvious political elements. In addition, there is considerable need to keep any particular resolution flexible enough to respond to changing circumstances. For these reasons, the
intervention of the judiciary with its relatively blunt doctrinal instruments
raises inevitable process questions. There is a substantial issue in all
school finance cases about the degree to which the courts should impose
constraints on the range of legislative choice. The judicial role will turn
somewhat on constitutional language, of course. But most state constitutional formulas are broad enough to leave room for much judicial interpretation and to accommodate a significant range of judicial roles.
The importance of fashioning a proper role for the courts was apparent
at the beginning. Legal attacks on current systems of school funding date
from the late 1960's. In McInnis v. Shapiro'9 and Burruss v. Wilkerson, 20 federal courts were asked to rule that the effect of existing
financing systems was that the education received by some children was
inferior to that received by others. In upholding these finance systems,
both courts recognized the difficulty of judicial resolution of the issues as
framed. Mclnnis held the controversy not justiciable because "there
[were] no 'discoverable and manageable standards' by which a court can
2
determine when the Constitution is satisfied and when it is violated." 1
Similarly, Burruss, in rejecting plaintiff's attack, noted that courts have
"neither the knowledge, nor the means, nor the power to tailor the public
22
moneys to fit the varying needs of" students.
With the publication of the Coons, Clune and Sugarman volume entitled Private Wealth and Public Education,23 a doctrinal approach to the
problem was presented which did not require courts to become mired in
the substantive debates over education, or to assume unmanageable
tasks. It proposed a subtle analytical tool based on the concept of "fiscalneutrality" which left courts free to deal with important structural parts
of the school funding problem, but left maximum policy choice in the
legislature. The theory of fiscal neutrality developed in the Coons work,
and the constitutional doctrine woven around it, involved a shift from a
concern for equality to a concern for fairness. While it was not feasible
for a court to mandate equality in education (given the definitional, poli19.
(1969).
20.
21.
22.

23.

293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. II1. 1968), affd mem. sub nor. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 384, U.S. 322
310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), affd men., 397 U.S. 44 (1970).
293 F. Supp. at 335 (footnote omitted).
310 F. Supp. at 574.
COONS, CLUNE & SUGARMAN, supra note 9.
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cing, and measurement problems), it was consistent with the judicial role
and with conventional equal protection analysis for a court to prohibit a
state from treating children differently in the absence of rational explanations for the difference. On this basis, for example, different spending
levels traceable to different amounts of taxable wealth in two districts
could be forbidden, unless the state could establish a connection between
the amount of taxable wealth in the districts and their educational
needs-clearly an impossible burden in most cases. Such a decision
would not depend on a judicial finding that equality was required, but on
the inability of the state to show a rational justification for the different
spending levels. Judicial adoption of such a theory would not mandate
statewide uniformity. The legislature would be free to adopt a uniform
system, or one in which there were local spending variations, provided
the variations were reflections of local taxpayer choice, and not the result
of the mere happenstance of the location of industrial or commercial
properties.
In Serrano v. Priest,24 the California Supreme Court adopted a version
of this fiscal neutrality theory, and with this judicial foundation the wave
of litigation began. The movement was only temporarily slowed by the
United States Supreme Court's adoption, in 1973, of a narrow view of
the requirements of the federal constitution. 25 Litigation continued on the
basis of the educational finance requirements of state constitutions. In
1978, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington 26 and a trial court in
New York 27 handed down lengthy opinions on the legality of the school
funding systems in those two states. In comparing these two judicial responses, this article will be especially concerned with the ways in which
different styles of judicial intervention expand or contract the range of
choice open to a legislature in designing the optimum blend of state and
local components of a school funding system.
III.

THE SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT LITIGATION

In its broad outlines, school finance in Washington in the early 1970's
followed a fairly traditional pattern. School districts received substantial
sums from state grants, but not nearly enough to provide adequate educational programs under state standards. As a result, there was a significant
24. 10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1970), opin. vacated and cause rev'd andremanded, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971), affd, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929(1976).
25. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (e.g., a 5-4 decision).
26. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wn. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978).
27. Board of Educ., Levittown v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct.
1978).
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reliance on locally voted funds. The Seattle School District, for example,
received about 60% of its revenue needs from state and federal sources.
leaving it dependent on locally voted (and unequalized) excess levies for
the remaining 40%.28
The first attack on the Washington system was in 1974, in Northshore
School District No. 417 v. Kinnear.29 Pursuing a fiscal neutrality argument under the Washington constitution, plaintiff school districts
attacked the unfairness implicit in a wealth-affected system. Plaintiffs
urged that a system which permitted district wealth to have demonstrable
effects on spending levels violated the constitutional provisions which
made it the "paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the
education" of the state's schoolchildren through a system that was "general and uniform. "30 In addition, the unjustified difference in treatment
of the children under the state's system was attacked as a violation of the
privileges and immunities clause of the state constitution, 31 treated by the
Washington courts as a state equivalent of the federal equal protection
clause. 32 The lower court found plaintiffs' allegations to be true: by itself
the state contribution to school finance was not ample, 33 and the supple34
menting system of locally voted levies was wealth-affected.
In an essentially opaque opinion for himself and two other members of
the court, Justice Hale concluded that plaintiffs had not established the
unconstitutionality of the system. Three other judges concurred in the result but not the opinion. Three justices dissented, in a lengthy opinion by
Justice Stafford. 35 Justice Hale's plurality opinion seemed to have
concluded that no matter how much variation existed in the treatment of
the state's schoolchildren, the system retained its generality, its uniformity, and its ampleness if all children received enough education to allow them to transfer to another district without loss of credit. Missing the
central thrust of the interparty fairness argument, Justice Hale held that uniformity at the barest threshold level satisfied the constitutional commands;
that some children were much better treated than others above that
minimum seemed not to be of constitutional significance, despite the
28. Seattle School Dist. No. I v. State, No. 53950, mem. op. at 29 (Thurston County Super.
Ct., Jan. 14, 1977).
29. 84 Wn. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974).
30. WASH. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1-2.
31. Id., art. I, § 12.
32. De Funis v. Odegaard, 82 Wn. 2d 11, 37, 507 P.2d 1169, 1185 n.16(1973).
33. Findings of Fact, Northshore School Dist. v. Kinnear, supra note 6, at 12-13, Facts 32, 33,
34, 35.
34. Id.at 12, 15, 18, Facts 31, 45, 59, 60, 61.
35. For a more complete analysis of the Northshore litigation, see Andersen, School Finance in
Washington-The Northshore Litigation and Beyond, 50 WASH. L. REV. 853 (1975).
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rather opposite tenor of constitutional terms such as uniformity and generality.
Justice Stafford's dissent also emphasized the ampleness issue rather
than the issues of interparty fairness. He found that because the state contributions were not ample, most districts were forced to rely on uncertain
local elections for important parts of their revenue. That compulsion,
said Justice Stafford, violates the constitution.
The Northshore opinions thus did not squarely address the fiscal neutrality theory of the complaint. The plurality opinion, the concurring
opinions, and the Stafford dissent focused instead on the issue of ampleness, and in the case of Justice Stafford, on the additional question of the
uncertainty of reaching ampleness in a system relying so heavily upon
local voting.
In the shadow of the Northshore opinions, attorneys for the Seattle
School District readied another assault on the summit. Since the fiscal
neutrality theory of the Serrano opinion and Northshore complaint and
briefs had not caught the enthusiasm of the court, the new case was
framed on a different theory. The district filed an original action in the
state supreme court seeking a declaratory judgment that the use of the
special levy system for school funding denied to many children the "ample provision" of education required by article IX, section 1, of the state
constitution. The district did not pursue the question of interparty fairness but instead embraced the theory of the Northshore dissent. It argued
that ampleness is destroyed by the wide use of special levies: in any district in which a levy fails, the state guarantee available for the school
36
year is not ample.
The cause was transferred to superior court for determination of legal
and factual issues. In March 1977 the Thurston County Superior Court
issued an opinion essentially agreeing with the school district's position.
The court said that special levies were unconstitutional except when used
for "enrichment" purposes, and that the state itself had to provide ample
education by funding all educational programs up to a level identified in
the opinion as "basic education." The superior court directed the legislature to enact the necessary legislation and to appropriate the necessary
37
funds so that the judicial mandate could be effective by July of 1979.
On appeal, the state supreme court largely affirmed the lower court decision. In a majority opinion by Justice Stafford-no different in substance from his Northshore dissent-the court first held that the duty36. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wn. 2d 476, 481, 585 P.2d 71, 76 (1978).
37. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, No. 53950, mem. op. (Thurston County Super. Ct., Jan.
14, 1977).
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imposing language of the constitution was not merely hortatory and was
not merely a preamble, but was a real duty in the Hohfeldian 38 sense.
The state had asserted that any duty imposed by the constitutional language was imposed on the legislature, and that the sole means of enforcement of such a duty was by the voters at the polls. 39 Justice Stafford conceded that all branches of the government had obligations to enforce the
constitution; nevertheless, he concluded that where important individual
rights were at stake, and where the very terms of the constitution itself
needed interpretation, the power to act was plainly within the judicial
40
province.
If the constitution creates a judicially enforceable duty, what then are
its terms? To begin with, the language of the constitution makes the duty
to make ample provision for education the "paramount" duty of the
state. The word paramount was given a fairly literal meaning by the Stafford opinion. The court said that by the use of the word, the constitution
has created a duty that is "supreme, pre-eminent or dominant." '4' Presumably, it is a duty which the state must meet even at the cost of being
unable fully to perform other constitutionally required duties.
The more complex issue concerns the substantive content of the duty.
In general, the court said that the duty to make ample provision is a duty
to provide resources that are " 'liberal, unrestrained, without parsimony,
full, sufficient.' "42 The court refused to give much specific content to
the duty thus described, since it wished to leave "the greatest possible
latitude" to the legislature "to participate in the full implementation of
the constitutional mandate." 43 The court, accordingly, refused plaintiff's
invitation to prescribe the state role in matters such as deployment of instructional and classified staff, staffing ratios, salaries, individualized
instruction for the handicapped, recognition of unique demographical
44
and geographical demands, and local control and support services.
Still, given the theory it was following, the court could not wholly
avoid the task of measuring educational benefits, for the plaintiff district
was alleging that the state had failed to meet its duty. The first step in the
court's analysis was a holding that the state's duty must be met by funds
38. The court cited Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Concepts as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). 90 Wn. 2d at 512 n.10, 585 P.2d at 91 n.10.
39. Reply Brief of Appellants at 22-23, Seattle School Dist. No. I v. State, 90 Wn. 2d 476, 585
P.2d 71 (1978).
40. 90 Wn. 2d at 504, 585 P.2d at 87.
41. Id. at 511,585 P.2d at 91.
42. Id. at 516, 585 P.2d at 93.
43. Id. at 515, 585 P.2d at 93.
44. Id. at 519-20, 585 P.2d at 95-96.
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over which local voters had no control. This meant that the issue was not
whether total school spending was ample but whether the state share by
itself was ample. This is so, said the court, because the local share-being subject to local veto-is not guaranteed to the district. The meaning
of the constitutional terms, said the court, is that ample education must
be provided "through dependable and regular tax sources." 45 Since special levies are neither dependable nor regular, the state could no longer
be permitted to rely on them in meeting its constitutional duty.
The question thus became whether the current level of state grants to
the Seattle School District met the constitutional duty to make ample provision for education. Laying down what it called "guidelines," the court
adopted some highly generalized propositions about what the legislature
was supposed to accomplish. It adopted the lower court's definition of
education as the " 'act of developing and cultivating the various physical, intellectual, esthetic and moral faculties,' ",46 and said the state's
duty "embraces broad educational opportunities needed in the contemporary setting to equip our children for their role as citizens and as potential
competitors in today's market as well as in the marketplace of ideas." 47
The state must prepare pupils "to exercise their First Amendment freedoms," and "to inquire, to study, to evaluate and to gain maturity and
48
understanding."
Obviously, such generalities will be of little aid to a legislature setting
a funding level for public education, and of even less help to a court
faced wih the task of determining if any given level of educational funding is constitutionally sufficient. Accordingly, the court felt obliged to go
further in considering the meaning of ample education.
The trial court had considered three possible definitions of ample education. It had looked first at the specifications for an adequate educational program promulgated by the State Board of Education and the
State Superintendent of Public Instruction. Second, it had examined the
level of education needed to meet state school accreditation standards.
Third, the trial court had examined-at plaintiff's instance-what was
called the "collective wisdom" approach to defining education, which
was based on a rough statewide average of educational spending. The
trial court had concluded that the state grants alone would not fund edu49
cation up to any one of these levels.
45. 90 Wn. 2d at 522, 585 P.2d at 97.
46. Id. at 516, 585 P.2d at 94.
47. Id. at 517, 585 P.2d at 94.
48. Id. at 517-18, 585 P.2d at 94.
49. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, No. 53950, mem. op. at 53 (Thurston County Super.
Ct., Jan. 14, 1977).
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The supreme court, making its own educational cost estimates for
meeting each of the three levels, agreed with the lower court's conclusion. The supreme court concluded that education which failed to meet
any of these standards could not be considered ample within the meaning
5
of the constitutional provision. 0
The resulting constitutional standard provides for a nondelegable duty
on the part of the state to fund education up to a basic or ample level,
without reliance on locally voted taxes. How much of education is basic
and how much is enrichment will depend on legislative choice within
these somewhat vague judicial standards. Beyond that level, special levies will still be permitted. Any such levies would, of course, be wholly
unequalized-wealthy districts will find it easier to obtain enrichment
51
than poor districts.
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Utter agreed that by any colorable definition of educational quality, the current state contribution
alone was inadequate. He was concerned, however, that the majority's
approach intruded further into the legislative process than was necessary.
For Justice Utter, it was sufficient to eliminate the specific part of the
finance system which produced wealth-related variations and levy loss
traumas-the special levy itself. He would limit the reach of the case to
declaring unconstitutional any school funding system which made "any
substantial part of the total school budget . . . subject to local veto."52
The system under review did not meet that constitutional standard, in
Justice Utter's view, since 30% to 40% of local school budgets in the
state were made up of special levy dollars, and therefore were subject to
being vetoed by local voters.
A three-judge dissent written by Justice Rosellini expressed the belief
that while the state's constitutional duty to fund the school system was
plain, it was not judicially enforceable. In Justice Rosellini's view, it was
a mistake for the court to interfere with legislative discretion as to the
definition of education, as to the level of funding, and as to the primacy
of this state obligation over other state duties. All these matters were
more appropriately left to the legislative branch. The usual ballot box
remedies for breach of the duties were adequate. Citing the New Jersey
experience 53 with this sort of judicial adventurism, Justice Rosellini also
50. 90 Wn. 2d at 535-36, 585 P.2d at 103.
51. The Stafford opinion was joined by Justices Wright, Brachtenbach, Horowitz, and Dolliver.
52. 90 Wn. 2d at 546, 585 P.2d at 109.
53. The New Jersey Supreme Court's experience was a classic case of judicial overinvolvement
in legislative matters. In April of 1973 the court held that New Jersey's school finance system was
unconstitutional under the state constitution, which required a "thorough and efficient" education.
Robinson v. Cahill I, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973). After permitting the parties to comment on
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stressed the dangers of this kind of detailed judicial involvement in mat54
ters essentially legislative.
On the central question under examination here-how much should
courts constrain legislative discretion in designing a state-local funding
system-the three opinions in the case took three quite different stances.
The majority opinion of Justice Stafford disavowed any intent to intrude
in legislative matters at all. But, in fact, the opinion substantially limited
the range of legislative choice. To begin with, the majority opinion removed from possible legislative choice any system with significant local
control over funding levels. No legislative plan can meet the Stafford requirements that is not essentially a fully state funded plan. While the debates still continue on the virtues of local control of funding, 55 wholly
eliminating legislative consideration of the option hardly seems

nonintrusive.
Moreover, the majority opinion purported to lay down substantive educational guidelines. These may be so vague as to be meaningless as
guides to the legislature, but at least the court felt it was framing some
principles of operational significance in the legislative halls.
On closer examination, of course, the majority opinion might tolerate,
as an appropriate level, the existing total level of educational fundingrepresented by the "collective wisdom" of the state's school districts. If
the content of the judgment, the court-perhaps perceiving the difficulty its adoption of a substantive standard would produce-stayed its hand, and gave the legislature 18 months to resolve the matter. Robinson v. Cahill II, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d 65 (1973). When the legislature failed to agree on
a new finance system within the prescribed time, the court heard again from the parties and stayed its
hand a second time. Robinson v. Cahill III, 67 N.J. 35, 335 A.2d 6 (1975). The legislature's continued refusal to act thereafter backed the court into a comer and forced it to order some reallocation of
school monies, over the strenuous opposition of the state legislature and several dissenting judges.
Robinson v. Cahill IV. 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713 (1975).
Finally, in late 1975, the legislature did enact a "reform" law which was immediately challenged
by the plaintiffs as inadequate. The new law did not abolish local property taxes for funding schools,
did not substantially mitigate the influence of wealth differences among districts, and only nominally
increased the state's share of school funding. It seems generally agreed that the law did not significantly change the existing system. R. LEHNE, THE QuEsT FORJUSTICE 200 (1978); Coons, Recent
Trends in Science Fiction:Serrano Among the People of Numbers, 6 J.L. & Eouc. 23, 36(1977).
Disregarding these concerns, the court quickly capitulated and approved the new system. Robinson
v. Cahill V, 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976). Still, the problem was not resolved. The legislature
failed to fund the system and the court was asked once again to intervene. With no alternative left, the
court ordered the New Jersey school system to close. Robinson v. Cahill VI, 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d
457 (1976). Following the court-ordered closure, the legislature passed a highly controversial income
tax measure to fund the schools. The court responded by reopening the schools and the issue was
finally resolved. Robinson v. Cahill VII, 70 N.J. 464, 360 A.2d 400 (1976).
This textbook example of a power struggle among the courts, the legislature and the governor is the
JUS1cE (1978), a study of the judicial system in a
subject of Professor Lehne's book, THE QuEsr FOR
role far removed from its usual adjudicatory function.
54. 90 Wn. 2d at 578-79, 585 P.2d at 127-28.
55. See notes 15, 16 supra, and 88 infra.
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that is a fair inference, the majority opinion-despite its substantive
guidelines and principles-in effect only commanded the legislature to
change the method by which the existing level of education is funded.
Henceforth, those funds must come from the state and not be subject to
local voting. If this is where the majority opinion really led, it arrived by
a roundabout and obscure route at the precise point of the Utter concurrence: that the state should be prohibited only from allowing local voting
to affect educational funding levels.
Justice Utter's more candid approach would seem far preferable.
While it also eliminated legislative choice of local control, it did leave
the legislature free (subject only to electoral checks) to fund education at
whatever level it feels appropriate given the wealth of the state as a
whole, changing perceptions about the importance of education, and
competing demands on the state's financial resources. There was no judicial pressure here-rhetorical or otherwise-to raise educational spending to any particular (basic) level. Nor was there any judicial formulation
of educational standards by which legislative choice could be cabined.
Justice Utter believed the majority opinion went too far in holding that
"the constitution mandates a specific 'basic education' . . . . For the
court to cast in terms of constitutional doctrine the meaning of this term
... deprives the people of this state of a continuing legislative and political dialogue on what constitutes a proper education.' 56
The dissent, unwilling to interfere with the legislative discretion even
to this degree would have held against plaintiff. Justice Rosselini's opinion is an impressive statement of the values in the separation of powers
doctrine and a forceful reminder of the natural limits of the judicial
power.
A final note on the Seattle case concerns its treatment of the Northshore decision. As has been indicated, the theories of the two cases were
deliberately different. The Northshore plaintiffs complained, in part,
about funding differentials growing out of differing district property
wealth. In Seattle, on the other hand, the plaintiff focused primarily on
the adequacy and dependability of the funding levels. Had it been
upheld, the Northshore theory would have accommodated special levies
if they were equalized; the theory advanced in Seattle was aimed essentially at eliminating local choice of funding levels and moving to full
state funding. Because these were fundamentally different lawsuits, it
would have been a simple matter for the Seattle court to have distinguished Northshore. But Justice Stafford and the other Northshore dissenters-their numbers augmented by new additions to the bench-made
56.

90 Wn. 2d at 547, 585 P.2d at 109.
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no attempt to distinguish Northshore. Instead, Justice Stafford's majority
opinion in Seattle goes out of its way in a number of places to expressly
overrule the Northshore case. 57 It should also be noted that the remaining
members of the Northshore majority were, with the exception of Justice
Wright, dissenters in Seattle. All this would seem to suggest that the different outcomes in the two cases were ultimately not so much a function
of different "legal theories or different trial strategies, but rather a
reflection of personnel changes on the court.
IV.

THE LEVITTOWN LITIGATION

A few months before the Seattle case was handed down, a trial court in
New York published a lengthy opinion striking down the New York system of funding public education. In Board of Education, Levittown v.
Nyquist 58 two groups of plaintiffs challenged the New York educational
funding system. The original plaintiffs were school districts and pupils in
the system. A second group of plaintiffs was allowed to intervene representing certain of the large urban school districts in the state. All plaintiffs sought a declaration that the system violated both federal and state
constitutions. 59 In addition, the intervenor large-city plaintiffs sought
redirection of apspecial relief for large-city systems, including judicial
60
act.
to
failed
legislature
the
if
propriated funds
The New York school funding system is similar in its essentials to the
Washington system examined above. State and local governments are
both heavily involved as funding partners in the system, and the effect of
wealth differences and of cost differences is therefore likely to be significant. 61 Under the 1974 New York financing law, the more than 700 New
York local school districts receive funds from three sources: approximately 5% comes from the federal government, over 50% comes from
locally levied property taxes, and about 40% comes from the state
6
through a series of grants and allocations under various aid formulas. 2
The basic system guarantees any district willing to impose a 15 mill local
property tax that it would receive a minimum of $1200 per pupil. Pupil
weightings gave some recognition of cost differences among the various
areas within the state. This had the effect, for example, of diverting addi57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 514, 520, 522, 537, 585 P.2d at 93, 96, 97, 104.
94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
Id. at 609-10.
Id. at 611.
Id. at 614-17.
Id. at 614-15; ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,

FISCAL FEDERALISM 1978-79 EDrTON 19, Table 12 (1979).
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tional funds into districts with heavy concentrations of disadvantaged
children. In addition, a flat grant system was in effect which provided all
districts with additional dollars. 63 Certain state monies were provided in
the form of specifically identified categories of expense, such as transportation or construction. Finally, there were "save-harmless" provisions, the effect of which was to produce funding patterns that were more
64
the product of history than the above described allocation formulas.
The legal attack on this system did not follow the Seatle approach.
The theory of the complaints in Levittown did not focus on the constitutional adequacy of any particular funding level. Rather, as in Serrano
and Northshore, the original plaintiffs sought to establish constitutional
infirmities in the unequal provision of taxing resources in the different
school districts. These plaintiffs alleged that there were wide disparities
in property tax wealth among the state's school districts which affected
the equality of educational opportunity. 65 The record showed that the
poorest district in New York had approximately $8900 per pupil in taxable property, while the wealthiest had over $412,000 per pupil. Even
the 80% of the districts in the middle of the wealth spectrum ranged from
$20,000 to $90,000 per pupil in taxable wealth. 66 Plaintiffs argued that
with local taxes making up more than half the total school budget, this
differential capacity to raise money would have inevitable effects on educational spending. The record seemed to bear this out: on the average,
property-poor districts spent about $1700 per pupil, while property-rich
districts spent about $3700.67

An additional form of discrimination was raised by the intervenor
large-city school districts. In any equalization program in which funds
are allocated with an eye to the grantee's wealth and costs, accurate measurement of both wealth and costs is critical. The large-city districts
argued that the existing formulas for measuring district wealth significantly overstated their wealth while at the same time the existing cost formulas greatly understated their true costs. 68 Thus, even if the original
plaintiffs succeeded in ridding the system of the first form of wealth discrimination discussed above, the large city school districts would remain
disadvantaged so long as these measurement errors remained in the allocation formulas.
63. The formula for this program was not quite flat: wealthier districts received a little less per
pupil than poorer districts. 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 613.
64. Id. at 613-14.
65. Id. at 609-11.
66. Id. at 614-15.
67. Id. at 617.
68. Id. at 611.

School Finance Litigation
The wealth measure in use was, as has been indicated, assessed-valueper-pupil. Plaintiff intervenors argued that this wealth measure was unfair to districts which suffered from what is termed "municipal overburden": large cities were burdened with such significant noneducational
expenses that a given dollar of assessed value available for taxation already had substantial claims on it when it came time to raise money for
education. These plaintiffs showed that New York City, for example,
spent some $400 per capita on noneducational expenses, while cities in
the remainder of the state spent less than $200 per capita for such expenses. 69 These differences arose from the fact that urban populations are
very costly to serve. The elderly, the very young, and the uneducated are
high-cost citizens, especially when living in dense population groupings
with deteriorating housing stocks. 70 Compared to small cities, therefore,
large cities bear significantly greater per capita tax burdens for such noneducational local services as police, fire, welfare, health care, medicaid,
corrections, courts, transportation, and parks. For taxpayers so disproportionately burdened by noneducational expenditures, dollars for
education require a much greater sacrifice. Stated otherwise,- any given
level of assessed-value-per-pupil overstates the real tax wealth available
to finance education in any district in which noneducational expenses are
significantly above average-the typical plight of large-city school districts.
Not only was their wealth overstated by the assessed-value-per-pupil
measure, argued the intervenors, their educational costs were greatly understated. It was urged that a pupil in an urban school setting costs much
more to educate than a pupil in other settings. The record showed that
larger districts had per pupil costs 47% higher than did the smaller districts. 7 1 These higher costs arose from higher salary levels said to be
required to attract quality teachers into urban schools, plus the additional
costs associated with high concentrations of children with impaired mental and physical health, learning disabilities, language problems, vocational training needs, and the like. In addition, the cost of maintaining
physical plants is greater in urban areas.
The court first dismissed the original plaintiff's claims under the federal constitution, feeling itself foreclosed by the United States Supreme
Court's decision in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez.72 Turning to the state equal protection analysis presented by
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 621.
Id. at 622.
Id. at 624.
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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the original plaintiffs, the court began by identifying the factual components of the alleged discrimination, and essentially agreed with the plaintiff's allegations. 73 The court found discrimination in the "markedly
unequal distribution of real property value among the state's school districts," a corresponding "unequal access to taxable real property
wealth," a "strong relationship between the disparities in the distribution
of taxable real property wealth and the disparate levels of local expenditures," and the "significant consequences that flow from the inability of
property-poor districts to attain the spending level of property-rich districts," consequences extending to such matters as "difference in tax
burden, professional staff ratios, class size, curriculum offerings, teacher
characteristics, services available to pupils and the availability of equipment and supplies." ,74 On the issue of the effect of money on educational
quality, the court conceded that a dispute was raging among the students
of the problem, 75 but concluded that the failure of the experts to agree
should not be allowed to validate a funding scheme in which some districts have demonstrably superior student-teacher ratios, curricula,
teacher quality, student services, support for special problem children,
and supplies. Since in each of the areas mentioned wealthier districts had
significant advantages over poorer districts, the court was willing to con76
clude that the discrimination in funding affected educational quality.
On this factual basis, the court rooted its legal analysis. It examined
the legality of this discrimination under the state's equal protection
clause using two standards: the "sliding scale" standard and the "rational basis" standard. 77 Under the sliding scale standard, the court determines whether the challenged discrimination serves a substantial state interest and, if so, whether there are less restrictive ways of achieving
those goals. The purposes of the school funding are clearly substantial;
they include providing " 'a system of free common schools,' " "affording all school children . . . equal educational opportunity," and "remedying inequalities in such educational opportunities. "78 Referring to
recent studies and experimentation in other states, the court found that
79
there are less restrictive alternatives available to accomplish these ends.
The court said: "[T]here exists a body of knowledge .. .available for
73. 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 634--40.
74. Id. at 637.
75. Id. at 618-19.
76. Id. at 637.
77. Id. at 636. The court refused to apply the strict scrutiny standard to these facts because of a
prior decision by the New York Court of Appeals holding that education was not a fundamental interest. Levy v. City of New York, 38 N.Y.2d 653, 345 N.E.2d 556, 382 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1976).
78. 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 636.
79. Id. at 637-38.
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consideration by the legislature concerning methods [less objectionable
than those] currently employed." 80 The court concluded that the current
system, judged by the sliding scale approach, "denies the .. . plaintiffs
equal protection of the law under . . . the New York State Constitu-

tion. "81
The court next considered whether the funding system met the less
demanding rational basis test, the conventional inquiry into the adequacy
of the justifications asserted on behalf of differential treatments. Reviewing the operation of the system, the court found that especially because of
the implicit tax wealth discrimination, the use of flat grants, and the
save-harmless provisions, the system did not represent a reasonable
method of reaching legitimate goals. To the contrary, the court found the
system tended to perpetuate the very wealth discrimination it was designed to eliminate. Referring to the "irrationality of the manner in
which the state aid system actually operates," the court concluded that
the system did not satisfy the rational basis test for compliance with equal
82
protection requirements of the state constitution.
Turning to the case of the large-city intervenors, the court found that
the equal protection clauses of both the state and federal constitutions had
been violated. 83 The court accepted as a matter of fact the theory of municipal overburden, calling the per pupil wealth standards "flawed measures of fiscal capacity. "84 On the question of special urban costs, the
court likewise accepted plaintiff-intervenor's allegations. The court
spoke of the state's failure to "give effect to the overburdening factors
affecting large-city school districts.' '85 As a result, significant numbers
of large-city pupils attended schools with inadequate buildings and physical security, restricted sports and recreational activities, insufficient library facilities and health services, and diminished offerings in art and
music.

86

The court concluded on these facts that the state's treatment of the
large-city school districts bore "no reasonable relation to the statute's
purpose of providing state aid to districts in proportion to their need..

80. Id. at 638.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 639. The court also held that the system violated article 11, section I of the New York
Constitution which requires that the legislature support and maintain a system of free schools. Id. at
640.
83. Id. at 641-42.
84. Id. at 641.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 634.
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(and] must be found therefore to constitute a denial of equal protection of
the law . . *''87
In all of these legal conclusions, several matters stand out. First, the
court put substantial weight on new research and state experimentation
with systems of school finance-the post-Serrano wave of reforms.
Given the controversy these issues have raised in the literature, 88 one
may doubt whether there is now established a set of proven alternatives
for school finance which are effectively wealth neutral. Levittown, however, did not impose on plaintiffs the burden of making such a showing. 89 It was enough that there was credible testimony that such alternatives have been discussed, and that they were "susceptible to being
fashioned to suit the needs of New York's educational system.''90 The
New York court seems here to have taken a critial step. How much
weight should a court put on tentative, incomplete social science research
findings, especially in a litigation setting where what is at stake are farreaching changes in institutional structure? McDermott's persuasive
87. Id. at 641.
88. The controversy over reform has been substantial. The principal reform techniques are reviewed in Barro, supra note 18 and Grubb, The FirstRound of Legislative Reforms in the Post-Serrano World, 38 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 459 (1974). Criticism of Serrano-inspired reform comes froma
variety of perspectives. The literature includes Bateman & Brown, Some Reflections on Serrano v.
Priest, 49 URB. L. ANN. 201 (1972); Billings & Legler, FactorsAffecting Educational Opportunity
and Their Implicationsfor School FinanceReform: an Empirical Study, 4 J.L. & EDUC. 633 (1975);
Bowman, Tax Exportability, Intergovernmental Aid, and School Finance Reform, 27 NAT'L TAX J.
163 (1974); Carrington, On EgalitarianOverzeal: A Polemic Against the Local School PropertyTax
Cases, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 232; Gatti & Tashman, Equalizing Matching Grants and the Allocative
and Distributive Objectives of Public School Financing, 29 NAT'L TAX J. 461 (1976), reviewed in
Johnson & Collins, Equalizing Matching Grants and the Allocative and Distributive Objectives of
Public School Financing:Comment, 31 NAT'L TAX J. 197 (1978); Glickstein & Want. Inequalityin
School Financing: The Role of the Law, 25 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1973); Margolis, Public School
Finance in Connecticut:An Urban Perspective, II CONN. L. REV. 1 (1978); Moynihan, Solving the
Equal Educational Opportunity Dilemma: Equal Dollars Is Not Equal Opportunity, 1972 U. ILL.
L.F. 259; Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public Education, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1355
(1971); Silard & Goldstein, TowardAbolition of Local Funding in Public Education, 3 J.L. & Eouc.
307 (1974); Simon, The School FinanceDecisions: Collective Bargainingand Future Finance Systems, 82 YALE L.J. 409 (1973); Treacy & Frueh, Power Equalization and the Reform of Public
School Finance, 27 NAT'L TAX J. 285 (1974); Vieira, Unequal Educational Expenditures:Some Minority Views on Serrano v. Priest, 37 Mo. L. REV. 617 (1972); Zelinsky, Educational Equalization
and Suburban Sprawl: Subsidizing the Suburbs Through School Finance Reform, 71 Nw. L. REV.
161 (1976).
89. Other courts have been much less generous to plaintiffs. Some hold that in the absence of
proof that such alternatives are in fact workable, they cannot qualify as less restrictive alternatives
for equal protection purposes. Rodriguez is the prominent example. 411 U.S. 1,42 (1973). Something of the same flavor can be found in cases like Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368,
390 N.E.2d 813 (1979) and in Northshore School Dist. v. Kinnear, 84 Wn. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 178
(1974) (in each case, note especially the dissent's concern that the majority does not give sufficient
weight to facts proven by plaintiffs).
90. 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 637-38.
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work on the state of this research 91 suggests to this writer that this aspect
of school finance litigation might be an appropriate place for the careful
use of presumptions. 92 And it may be that if a presumption were to be
deliberately fashioned, the Levittown court's approach might be the better one: on a threshold showing by plaintiff's witnesses that research
findings have generated plausible alternatives, the court would presume
their practical availability until persuaded otherwise by the weight of the
evidence. Whatever the approach, a fuller discussion of the matter by the
court would have been helpful in formulating the presumption with some
precision, in specifying the conditions which would rebut it, and in identifying the limits of its effect.
The second significant element of the New York court's legal analysis
is that it accepted the relevance of municipal overburden and high urban
school costs. Other courts have been presented with the municipal overburden argument with varying degrees of intensity of proof. Some have
reached contrary conclusions. 93 The Levittown court is the first to embrace the theory with any enthusiasm; if the result survives appellate
review, the New York litigation will surely be a cornerstone in the development of the theory. As with the court's reliance on social science research, however, the matter is deeply controverted, and a fuller judicial
discussion would have been helpful. A franker recognition of the existing
controversy would have lent weight to the court's conclusion.
Many believe there is no logic in increasing school aid to a district
merely because residents of the district face high welfare or police costs.
The logical cure for that, say the critics, is state subventions in aid of
welfare or police. 94 The court briefly referred to defendants' witnesses on
this matter. Defendants could not, of course, contest the fact that non91. INDErERMINANCY tN EDUCATION (J. McDermott ed. 1976); McDermott & Klein, The CostQuality Debate in School Finance Litigation: Do Dollars Make a Difference, 38 L. & CoNTEMP.
PROB. 415 (1974).
92. See Coons, Recent Trends in Science Fiction: SerranoAmong the People of Numbers, 6 J.L.
& EDUC. 23 (1977).
93. For example, the Supreme Court in Rodriguez found increased expenses in urban areas did
not give rise to special constitutional status, 411 U.S. at 11-12. Likewise, the Ohio Supreme Court
was skeptical of the legal significance of the claims of large cities. Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58
Ohio St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d 813, 824-25 (1979). See also Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327,
336 n.38 (N.D. 111.1968), affd mem. sub nom., Mclnnis v.Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); Lindsay
v. Wyman, 372 F. Supp. 1360, 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
94. One of the defendant's prominent witnesses, Dean Dick Netzer of the Graduate School of
Public Administration of New York University, stated in a recent letter to the New York Times:
Public-finance economists are close to unanimous in considering the "municipal overburden"
argument to be without merit. If cities have high non-school costs because they are saddled with
fiscal responsibility for welfare, pay high salaries and fringe benefits to non-school employees
or choose to engage in a host of marginal activities, then those problems should be addressed
directly, by state assumption of welfare costs, tough collective bargaining, better management,
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educational expenses were higher in large cities. But they did urge that
any extra noneducational tax burden in urban areas was within the control of local taxpayers; such taxpayers should not be allowed to choose
higher quality municipal services and then, complaining about municipal
overburden, ask for additional state school aid. Plaintiffs responded by
urging that increased expenses in urban areas were not a matter of
choice, but were instead required by the very nature of urban life.
The court agreed with plaintiffs that these expenses were "inexorable," and concluded that the witnesses for the state failed to show how
a city could avoid present levels of noneducational expenses. 95 That
plainly is a difficult burden to impose on a defendant, and it is not at all
clear how it could ever be met. Moreover, such a showing is not logically dispositive of the issue to be decided: whether school monies
should be increased because of higherpolice costs. The court found, nevertheless, that municipal overburden must be recognized in state funding
formulas and that its factual basis in this case had been "satisfactorily
96
established by the evidence presented."
Closely related to the overburden argument is the court's acceptance of
the existence and relevance of increased costs of education in urban areas
and of the increased cost of educating urban pupils. As indicated above,
plaintiffs showed that significantly higher per pupil costs were incurred
in urban school systems. The accuracy of this proof is not easy to contest, though some of it will be arguably impressionistic. 97 Even where the
numbers are firm, however, their meanings are disputable. Higher costs
may reflect increased costs of doing business in urban areas, as the court
found, or may merely reflect higher program quality levels-a cause for
greater spending that is not necessarily something the state should be
compelled to subsidize. Higher teacher salaries may reflect the unattractiveness of urban areas for teachers, or may be caused, as some allege,
by a district's unwillingness to battle teacher unions. That urban districts
have greater concentrations of poor and minority students may mean, as
or whatever. It makes no sense to increase school aid to offset deficiencies in welfare finance or
city budgeting.
N.Y. Times, July 14, 1978, at A26, col. 4.
95. 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 623.
96. Id. at 624. The state argued that some of the increased expense of large-city school systems
was due to voluntary program decisions of those school districts which increased their costs. See
Brief for Defendants-Appellants, Supplemental Memorandum III at 28-32, Board of Educ., Levittown v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
97. It was the defendant's position that "[the trial Court's finding that minority children were
more expensive to educate was based solely on impressionistic testimony and generalizations which
were often contradictory, rarely supported, and largely irrelevant to the cost of educating these students." Brief for Defendants-Appellants, Supplemental Memorandum III at 58, Board of Educ.,
Levittown v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
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the Levittown court found, that urban districts need more educational resources, or it may mean, as some witnesses testified 98 that state grantsin-aid of welfare should be increased. Indeed, to the extent that the state
treasury is finite and claims for education and welfare are therefore mutually exclusive, the court's requirement that educational spending be
increased in urban areas could result in lower welfare spending in those
areas-not an obvious victory for -urban areas with their relatively high
proportion of welfare recipients and their relatively low proportion of
public school students. 99 Finally, there are the usual arguments about
whether additional amounts of money at the margin will make any difference in dealing with learning readiness, mental and physical health, poverty, and the other problems the court found to be disproportionately present in urban school systems.
On appeal, these issues will surely be debated. 10 0 If the trial court's
response to them is upheld, the pleas of the nation's urban school districts for recognition of the increased cost of education in dense urban
areas will have received significant legitimation, and that may make
them more persuasive in other judicial and legislative arenas.
From the perspective of this article, the most important aspects of the
New York opinion is the care with which the court selected a doctrine
which minimized constraints on future legislative choice. At the rhetorical level, the court made the usual disavowal of intent to affect legislative
choice:
It is not the desire or intent of the Court to express an opinion about the
suitability, [or] desirability . ..of the various [funding] techniques conceming which evidence was adduced at the trial.
...[Such matters are] for consideration by the legislature ....I01
•.. [T]his Court has deemed it necessary to refrain from expressing an
opinion as to the appropriateness of any particular means or technique for
attaining a suitable school finance system.., believing that "the ultimate
solutions must come from the lawmakers and from the democratic pres02
sures of those who elect them." 1
Unlike the Seattle court, however, the court here went beyond the
rhetoric of judicial nonintrusion, and selected a doctrine which insures
98. Id. at 56.
99. Id. at 56-57.
100. At this writing, the Levittown litigation is on appeal to the appellate division. In the meantime, New York's Governor Carey has appointed a 35 member commission headed by Max Rubin,
prominent New York lawyer and former head of the New York City Board of Education, to examine
the present state school funding system. Hugh L. Carey, Governor of the State of New York, Press
Release (Sept. 22, 1978) (on file with Washington Law Review).
101. 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
102. Id. at 645.
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significant legislative choice about the proper blend of state and local
components of the school finance system. Under the opinion, the legislature would be free to choose a fully state funded system, in which local
choice over funding levels would be wholly eliminated. Apparently, the
only requirement would be that real cost differences among the various
areas of the state be recognized in the allocation of state monies, in order
that high-cost urban districts would not fare less well than low-cost districts. At the other end of the state-local spectrum, the legislature is free
to give local choice whatever role is felt useful, including complete local
control of funding levels. 103 The opinion requires only that in such a system choice in real terms be equally available to all districts. Presumably,
if local control of funding is chosen, real equality of choice would
require some form of power equalizing'0 4 formula or its functional equivalent to assure that similar levels of local tax effort produce similar levels
of dollars per unit. In measuring these similarities, of course, higher urban school costs and municipal overburden would need to be considered.
V.

LIMITATIONS ON THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN
STRUCTURING SCHOOL FUNDING SYSTEMS

This article has examined some broad questions concerning the proper
blend of state and local components in an effective and fair school funding system. More narrowly, the analysis has focused on the appropriate
judicial posture when the constitutional adequacy of an existing system is
challenged in litigation. Comparing the approaches of the New York and
the Washington courts suggests some further refinements of the question.
In fashioning a useful and effective judicial role, the following limiting
factors need to be kept in mind.
A.

Problems Associated With the Data Base Used in School Funding
Cases

Different legal doctrines put different stresses on the use of and need
for data. A tort doctrine which imposes liability without fault requires
less information about the conduct of the parties than does a doctrine
which imposes liability only on a showing of negligence. An antitrust
doctrine imposing liability on a per se basis requires less in the way of
information about an arrangement's harms and benefits than does a doc103. The court expressly noted that delegation of funding decisions to local districts would be
permissible, as would continued reliance on locally imposed property taxes. Id. at 640.
104. For a general description of such formulas, see CooNs, CLUNE & SUGARMAN, supra note 9,
at 200-44; Barro, supra note 18.
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trine making liability turn on the reasonableness of the practice. In an
area of rapidly growing research, courts must take special care to avoid
doctrine which requires more in the way of accuracy and reliability than
the state of the art fairly permits. This, in turn, suggests that litigants and
their counsel should seek to avoid overselling current research findings in
attacking or defending school funding systems.
There is persuasive opinion that the current state of social science research in this area is still so primitive that its findings are probably not
reliable guides for specific administrative action, are certainly not reliable guides for legislative use, and are wholly unsuited for something as
general and as permanent as constitutional interpretation.105 Findings of
that quality are misused when offered as answers to specific questions of
10 6
educational policy and practice.
The problem, in part, is that current research does not touch, much
less resolve, critical questions necessary for the resolution of many educational funding disputes. We have inadequate evidence, for example, of
the effects of various school funding formulas on discrete subgroups of
the population, such as the poor or the educationally disadvantaged. We
know too little about the effects of such formulas in different areas (such
as urban and rural populations), or on different programs, or on patterns
of school governance.1 07 We know little about the effects of differently
composed tax bases on school spending, about the effects of different
patterns of tax incidence, or about the consequences of the various redistributive measures making up current property tax reform programs.10 8
Indeed, there is under way today an "agonizing reappraisal" of the fundamental child development theories from which all education reform
09

flows. 1

Another part of the difficulty-especially relevant to the possibilities
of judicial appraisal-is that what data we have is highly technical. Even
in a nonmathematical summary, the reader will quickly confront such
questions as whether the relationships between district wealth and income are curvilinear or merely linear,1 0 whether fiscal neutrality should

105. Wise, Forewardto IkNram iNANcy IN EDUCATION at ix (J. McDermott ed. 1976).
106. Coons, supra note 92, at 30-31; Levin, Education, Life Chances, and the Courts: The Role
of Social Science Evidence, in INDrmMutNANCY INEDUCATION (J. McDermott ed. 1976).
107. Odden, School Finance Reform: Emerging Issues and Needed Research, in DILEMMAS IN
SCHoOL FINANCE (J. Thomas & R. Wimpelberg eds. 1978).
108. Id..
109. R. DELoNE, SMAL Fttmms (1979). See especially chapter 4.
110. They may become curvilinear at some point. Hickrod & Hubbard, Illinois School Finance
Research, in DILEMMAS INSCHOOL FINANCE 67-68 (J. Thomas & R. Wimpelberg eds. 1978).
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be measured with gross or net elasticities, 1 1or whether one is justified in
using the Lorenz-Gini procedure for comparing districts' wealth and
spending. 112 To further compound the difficulty, these refined, theoretical concepts must be used in a practical world where measurement is
clouded by such matters as overlaping district boundaries, wealth and income data collected for cities and counties but not often for school districts, the presence of substantial state and federal aid programs, and the
absence of reliable cost accounting systems with which to compare districts and programs. 113
Apart from the reliability of the data, there is often a serious question
about its relevance. For example, a plaintiff in a school finance case may
be able to prove that spending disparities are positively correlated with
tax base disparities, but unable to show with available social science
research techniques that the education programs in underfunded districts
produce outputs measurably different from those of the wealthy districts.
Should such a plaintiff lose? Some have argued that such a showing is
necessary, 114 and most plaintiffs have made some effort to make such a
showing. Some plaintiffs have indeed lost, in part, because of an inability to persuade a judge that money made a difference. 115 But is it really
relevant to equal protection analysis that a person complaining about differential treatment by the state is unable to prove anything beyond the
concededly different government treatment? McDermott has argued persuasively that equal protection should mean that government should not
treat people differently, regardless of whether the different treatment can
be shown to have any particular sort of demonstrable effects. "16 Surely, if
the government spent more money on male students than on female
students, on white students than on black students, or on students from
Republican families than on students from Democratic families, no
showing beyond the different sums would be required of a plaintiff
•laiming a denial of equal protection. No persuasive reason appears for
11l. Net elasticities are more precise, but availability of data to determine gross elasticities, and
acceptability of the results mean that gross elasticities are more frequently used. Id. at 76-77.
112. The Lorenz-Gini procedure "appears to work well ....
[but] [n]either the descriptive nor
the inferential properties of this quantitative technique are fully known at present . . ." Id. at 77.
113. As Klein concluded, some uses of these data are "venture[s] in correlating the mysterious
with the unknown." Klein, Cost-Quality Research Limitations: The Problem of PoorIndices, in IN.
DETERMINANCY IN EoUCATION 49 (J. McDermott ed. 1976). See also Hickrod & Hubbard, supra note
110, at 80-81.
114. See Lindquist & Wise, supra note 2, at 53-55; Note, A StatisticalAnalysis of the School
Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303, 1315-17 (1972).
115. Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635, 641-42 (1975); Northshore School
Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wn. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974) (See especially concurring opinion
of Justice Rosellini.).
116. McDermott & Klein, supra note 91, at 432-33.
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putting a plaintiff to a higher standard in school finance litigation. "17 And
if one accepts that postion, an enormous body of social science literature
and research-that bearing on the effect of dollars on educational quality-becomes largely irrelevant. Equality of input is required, not equality of output.
None of this is intended to minimize the utility of research. Indeed, the
opposite message is ultimately intended-we desperately need more and
better research. It is vital that these complexities be the subject of continuing study in the hope that the. uncertainties can be reduced in the future.
Nonetheless, most social science experts would readily admit that current evaluation efforts are relatively primitive and cannot readily serve as
bases for policy decisions about education.' 18 Until reliability is very
sharply increased, and relevance is convincingly established, courts
should be very cautious about using the limited and tentative conclusions
of this research for definitive, concrete policymaking. It is especially
dangerous to do so when the court is being asked to order long-term and
fundamental institutional changes.
No easy strategy can be devised for operating in an area in which such
massive consequences rest on such insecure footings. Humility thus
seems a becoming virtue in both judges and advocates. And, as suggested, presumptions may be useful devices to explore, choosing always
those that seem designed to generate the most reliable data and to energize the most searching scrutiny.
B.

Problems Associated with the Nature of JudicialMachinery

There can be little doubt that courts will have special trouble dealing
with these mysteries. In part the problem is the data. Another part is the
generalist nature of our judges-a highly prized judicial quality in which
lies much of what we call wisdom, but which is not profitably employed
in vast enterprises requiring intimate familiarity with technical, sophisticated, and highly controverted questions of statistical method and
educational policy. A third part of the problem is a consequence of the
very form of the judicial machinery itself. Reading a transcript or a record in one of these cases impresses one with the limited value of the testimonial process as a way of discerning truth when data are soft and key
concepts undefined. The parties parade before the court witnesses of im117. Indeed, the dangers of hinging equal protection on demonstrable consequences have long
been known. See Cahn, Jurisprudence(Annual Survey of American Law), 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 150,
168 (1955), discussed in Coons, supra note 53, at 27-31.
118. Mood, The State of the Art in EducationalEvaluation, in INDrERMINANCY IN EDUCATION 17
(J. McDermott ed. 1976).
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peccable background and experience to deliver their prepared view.
From the variety thus presented, the judge can largely pick what he
chooses. 119 Briefs by the losing party express astonishment that the trial
120
judge could have wholly disregarded the testimony of their experts.
Majority opinions holding against plaintiffs in school finance cases cannot seem to find any facts to show that the system is unfair or unequal, 12!
while dissenting opinions in such cases find the facts painstakingly established on the record. 122 In Levittown, the state's brief on appeal urges the
court to disregard entirely the factual components of the case (23,000
pages of testimony and 400 exhibits) and determine the matter on the law
alone.' 23 On the whole, the field has not been one in which courts have
found the search for truth easy, working as they must with the implements and tools of the judicial process.
Even if some consensus could be developed about the fundamental
factual premises of such litigation, there remains the problem of supervision and enforcement of any remedy ordered. We are dealing here with a
fast-moving, hotly contested field, in which events quickly outdate doctrine. The judicial process embraces very limited powers of continuous
supervision. As needs change, as priorities shift, as fiscal conditions alter, and as perceptions modify (and these permutations seem the only real
certainties) overseeing any substantive educational program, or
monitoring and evaluating any educational system, are not the sorts of
things courts can be expected to do. For all the brave judicial rhetoric
about the meaning of education and about the ways to achieve educational fairness, a somewhat narrower judicial role is desirable if one is
serious about effective employment of the judicial power as we know it.
Finally, as Lon Fuller has observed, 124 the judicial machinery is best at
doing what we call adjudication, a process which has important limits,
not lightly to be ignored. The sort of state-local institutional issues presented in school finance litigation involve highly intricate interrelationships and complex patterns of effects. Fuller calls such issues "polycentric"-issues in which the resolution of any part of a question has
complex and largely unforseeable repercussions on the remaining web of
119. Levin, supra note 106, at 136.
120. See, e.g., Brief for Defendants-Appellants, Supplemental Memorandum III at 21, 27, 40,
56, Points III-VI, Board of Educ., Levittown v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup.
Ct. 1978).
121. See, e.g., Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wn. 2d 685, 696-97, 530 P.2d
178, 185 (1974).
122. Id. at 742, 530 P.2d at 209. (dissent of Justice Stafford).
123. Brief for Defendants-Appellants, Supplemental Memorandum III at 8 n. 1, Board of Educ.,
Levittown v. Nyquist, 94 Misc. 2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
124. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
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issues. For resolving issues of that kind, the form of ordering we call adjudication is simply not suited. For example, among its attributes, adjudication requires that each affected party be provided a meaningful participation through proofs and argument-a virtual impossibility when the
precise effect on each party necessarily depends on the resolution
reached concerning all other parties. It is not simply a matter of a large
number of affected parties; it is instead the nature of the interrelationships. Such issues may be solved by some form of managerial discretion
(the baseball manager decides which players will play which positions)
or by some reciprocal process (an economic market makes highly complex and interrelated allocative decisions). But adjudication is not a useful way of resolving such matters. If judges are given such tasks, they
cease being judges in all but a nominal sense, and become mediators,
legislators, or other political functionaries. In his review of the New Jersey cases, Professor Lehrne observed that such cases
do not conform to the ... traditional model .... [T]he court system..
was not examining a private dispute between private parties ... [but rather
the] validity of established public policies. In such circumstances the bipolar format of courtroom adjudication made little sense.... [T]here was as
much, if not more, conflict among the defendants on one side of the courtroom and among the plaintiffs on the other side than there was between the
two supposedly antagonistic camps. 1
C. Problems Associated with the Nature of Legal Doctrine
It is not only the machinery of the law which imposes constraints on
useful judicial roles; the form of legal doctrine itself limits choice
significantly. Legal doctrine is in the form of general principle. Especially in constitutional litigation, such general formulations are necessary
if the decisions reached are to be properly grounded in prior legal authority, are to fit in some degree of order with other doctrine, and are to provide guidance with regard to a useful range of like questions. Yet
principles of this generality are of limited utility in resolving specific
questions of educational policy. As the New Jersey experience 126 makes
clear, the attempt to answer specific substantive questions with highly
general legal criteria comes very close to making a mockery of the entire
process of adjudication. 127
Further, legal doctrine can change only slowly in deference to the
other process values it must serve. If a court ventures too far into the spe125.
126.
127.

Lehne, supra note 53, at 198-99.
See note 53 supra.
Id.

169
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cifics of an educational policy dispute-especially, again, in the setting
of constitutional litigation-the characteristic drag of legal doctrine could
prove very hurtful. If one picks any substantive issue from this article
and asks if any prevailing consensus on the issue is likely to hold for
more than a year or two, one can sense the risk of footing any such wisdom in the cement of constitutional dogma. Suppose, for example, one is
persuaded that the concept of municipal overburden is useful and should
be used in fashioning a constitutional standard for an educational finance
system. In a year or two, smaller cities might begin to see that higher
police and welfare budgets would in part be compensated by the state in
the form of increased educational aid. If such a development resulted in
inflating police budgets generally, the idea of municipal overburden
would clearly be in need of revision. But how responsive can the legislature be when once the concept is woven into the fabric of the constitution? Especially in fields as fast-moving as this, freedom to change
seems unusually important, and specific legal mandates seem accordingly less desirable.

D.

The Problem of Legitimacy

A final concern about fashioning a judicial role is the question of legitimacy. Under our political system, it is assumed that judges should play
only a limited role in making important choices about the allocation of
public resources. Special care must be taken in articulating doctrine so
that any substantive policy judgments left to the judges are reduced to the
minimum. Since any blend of state and local components in a system of
public education finance will have significant allocative consequences,
any judicial prescription in the area will necessarily involve the judiciary
in allocating the public resources to some degree. This judicial role cannot be wholly eliminated. But it seems clear that there are important differences in degree. The Washington court in Seattle, for example, has
intruded much further into the choice of a state-local system than has the
New York court in Levittown. In Washington, nothing but a fully funded
state system is now possible; in New York, at least the possibility exists
for some decentralized funding decisions. The choice of so basic a matter
as the degree of local control of funding levels would appear to be too
fundamental and too far-reaching to be left to the judges if traditional no28
tions of legitimacy are to be respected. 1

128.

A. Cox,

THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

95-96 (1976).
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VI.

THE APPROPRIATE JUDICIAL ROLE

What role, then, is left for courts if the facts are too uncertain, the
standards too controverted, the supervision needs too great, and the allocative choices ultimately too political for appropriate judicial resolution?
The role of the courts in such a case is critical, if narrow. First, courts
can help bring into focus matters that need legislative attention. Legislative and administrative action in related areas of intradistrict equity, programs for handicapped children, and assistance to non-English speaking
students, for example, have followed judicial action1 29 which secured the
attention of the legislature in an undeniably powerful way. 130 Second, the
courts can sometimes help create the structural conditions for an effective
employment of the political process, as was done, for example, in the
reapportionment cases.
On questions of substance, too, courts can appropriately exercise an
important though narrow role. Much school finance litigation has been
rooted in spirit, if not in name, in the concepts of equal protection. Even
where other state constitutional terms have been relied on, they often
focus on the same question: Is the state treating some classes of schoolchildren differently, without justification? In such litigation, the narrow
judicial task is one of identifying, in general, the kinds and extent of differential treatment of schoolchildren which a particular finance system
entails, and then seeing if appropriate justifications exist for any significant differences noted.
Both the existence of differences and the justifications for them are
complex matters for judgment. For example, whether the state treats urban districts and nonurban districts differently when it grants them equal
dollars per pupil was a central issue in Levittown. It was not an easy difference to articulate, nor to measure. But in a broad way, the court
seemed to feel that there were significant differences in treatment, and
reaching that judgment is an important, if narrow, judicial task. Simi-

129. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (bilingual instruction); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348
F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (handicapped children); Pennsylvania Assoc. for Retarded Children v.
Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (handicapped children); Hobsen v. Hansen, 327
F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971) (intradistrict resource allocation).
130. Kirp, Law, Politicsand Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of JudicialInvolvement, 47 HARv. ED. Ray. 117, 134-36 (1977) details the legislative programs which have followed
this litigation.
In his analysis of the New Jersey school-finance litigation, Professor Lehne suggests that courts
can play an important role in "agenda-setting" on such matters. Of course, litigants inviting courts
to play such a role have an obligation, argues Leme, to frame theories which respect traditional roles
of other branches of government, on pain of having the reform effort ultimately fail. Lehne, supra
note 53, at 202.
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larly, while determining the adequacy of the justification for the difference calls for subtle judgment, a court should be able to perceive the
virtual absence of any justification. For example, when variations in
property tax wealth result in significantly higher spending levels in one
district than another, there is no apparent justification for the difference.
That is, no values of local control or of educational philosophy are involved. Citizens are being charged different tax prices for the same
goods as a result of the fortuitous location of industrial or commercial
properties. This is simply arbitrary, and a court need have no hesitancy in
so holding.
In identifying differences, courts should specify their causes with sufficient precision to allow an appropriately limited response. Again, the
approaches of the Washington and New York courts are different, and
the differences are instructive. In his Northshore dissent, Justice Stafford, though facing a complaint based on interdistrict tax base disparities, nevertheless characterized the differences among districts as matters
of underfunding, or of uncertain funding, using the failed special levy as
the usual example. While never stated this bluntly, this rather implies
that the real problem lies in the unwillingness of local taxpayers to support education. Although there was in the Northshore record no special
showing of local taxpayer irresponsibility, Stafford's characterization of
the problem effectively invited a complaint in Seattle which proposed as
a solution the elimination of most local control over school spending.
The New York court, by contrast, though surely facing as much a problem with local responsibility as was presented in Washington, nevertheless characterized the problem as a matter of unequal tax bases and discriminatory measures of district wealth. And that characterization
produced legal doctrine which left the New York legislature free to employ local choice so long as the local areas have something like equal opportunities to exercise choice. That approach limits judicial intrusion into
questions of essentially legislative nature, leaving the legislature free to
explore alternative funding modes and a wide range of state-local blends
in its continuing search for an optimum system. The narrow, surgical
stroke of the New York court seems preferable. Lon Fuller captured the
essence of the distinction when speaking of the appropriate role of the
court in cases that involve polycentric issues:
[While the market process is clearly a polycentric decision model] the laying down of rules that will make a market function properly is one for
which adjudication is generally well suited. The working out of our common law of contracts case by case has proceeded through adjudication, yet
the basic principle underlying the rules thus developed is that they should
promote the free exchange of goods, in a polycentric market. The court gets
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into difficulty, not when it lays down rules about contracting, but when it
131
attempts to write contracts.
Beyond focusing attention, insuring effective structure, and carefully
identifying differences and justifications, courts probably should not go.
As Professor Kirp has noted, gross inequities caused by a particular statelocal partnership can be reached with judicial tools, but
[s]ubtle questions of distributive justice persist [which] cannot be decided
solely by reference to the Constitution. Because they typically involve allocative choices among claimants who are nominally equally deserving, such
issues may be better fit for political rather than judicial resolution. They
seem best fit for joint resolution, the courts initially defining minimal constitutional guarantees, the legislative enactments giving substance to these
definitions, and the judiciary subsequently clarifying statutory ambigui32
ties.'

This would seem a large enough agenda for the courts. To do this surgical task and to do it well will reflect the kind of discerning, selflimitation which is, in the end, the indispensable condition for the effec33
tive use of the judicial power. 1

131. Fuller, supra note 124, at 403-04.
132. Kirp, supra note 130, at 137.
133. As this article went to press, Professor Fiss published a related study. Fiss, The Supreme
Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1979). Fiss makes a
thoughtful argument encouraging the wider use of judicial power in cases calling for structural reform. Taking a somewhat broader view of the judicial function than is here presented ("courts exist
to give meaning to public values, not to resolve disputes," id. at 29), Fiss finds the judicial office
structured to encourage objective appraisal of public values because of the dialogue which is a condition of the exercise of judicial power and because of the independence and impartiality of the judge.
Id. at 12-14. In relation to other branches of government, therefore, courts should not be regarded as
"default" institutions-authorized to act only when the other branches fail-but rather should be
accorded a central role, a role ultimately justified by the fact that judges are "in the best position to
discover the true meaning of our constitutional values." Id. at 58.
However one appraises Fiss's argument, the present article addresses a much narrower question:
whether courts should adopt broad doctrinal positions which foreclose significant areas of legislative
choice when narrower ground exist which are fully as effective in implementing the values at stake.
The argument here being made is not that judges need be timid in protecting constitutional values,
but only that in doing so courts should be sensitive to the constitutional roles of the other branches of
government. There is no apparent reason, in other words, why judges should be exempt from the
sensible restraint implicit in the notion of the "least restrictive alternative."

